Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Katzav on limitations of dispositions', 'On the Concept of Character' and 'The Epistemology of Essence (draft)'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


13 ideas

10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / a. Conceivable as possible
If conceivability is a priori coherence, that implies possibility [Tahko]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
Essences are used to explain natural kinds, modality, and causal powers [Tahko]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
We see our character as a restricting limit, but also as an unshakable support [Weil]
The concept of character is at the centre of morality [Weil]
We don't see character in a single moment, but only over a period of time [Weil]
We modify our character by placing ourselves in situations, or by attending to what seems trivial [Weil]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis]
Scientific essentialists tend to characterise essence in terms of modality (not vice versa) [Tahko]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / b. Scientific necessity
If essence is modal and laws are necessary, essentialist knowledge is found by scientists [Tahko]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis]