14 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
22708 | Good reasons must give way to better [Shakespeare] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
20304 | The cause of my action is in my will [Shakespeare] |
6613 | The natural kinds are objects, processes and properties/relations [Ellis] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
6616 | Least action is not a causal law, but a 'global law', describing a global essence [Ellis] |
6615 | A species requires a genus, and its essence includes the essence of the genus [Ellis] |
6614 | A hierarchy of natural kinds is elaborate ontology, but needed to explain natural laws [Ellis] |
6612 | Without general principles, we couldn't predict the behaviour of dispositional properties [Ellis] |