15 ideas
| 7306 | If the only property of a name was its reference, we couldn't explain bearerless names [Miller,A] |
| 13168 | My formal unifying atoms are substantial forms, which are forces like appetites [Leibniz] |
| 13169 | I call Aristotle's entelechies 'primitive forces', which originate activity [Leibniz] |
| 13170 | The analysis of things leads to atoms of substance, which found both composition and action [Leibniz] |
| 13171 | Substance must necessarily involve progress and change [Leibniz] |
| 7322 | Constitutive scepticism is about facts, and epistemological scepticism about our ability to know them [Miller,A] |
| 3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
| 7325 | Dispositions say what we will do, not what we ought to do, so can't explain normativity [Miller,A] |
| 7324 | Explain meaning by propositional attitudes, or vice versa, or together? [Miller,A] |
| 7323 | If truth is deflationary, sentence truth-conditions just need good declarative syntax [Miller,A] |
| 7315 | 'Jones is a married bachelor' does not have the logical form of a contradiction [Miller,A] |
| 7328 | The principle of charity is holistic, saying we must hold most of someone's system of beliefs to be true [Miller,A] |
| 7329 | Maybe we should interpret speakers as intelligible, rather than speaking truth [Miller,A] |
| 7333 | The Frege-Geach problem is that I can discuss the wrongness of murder without disapproval [Miller,A] |
| 13167 | We need the metaphysical notion of force to explain mechanics, and not just extended mass [Leibniz] |