32 ideas
| 8166 | Truth is part of semantics, since valid inference preserves truth [Dummett] |
| 8173 | Language can violate bivalence because of non-referring terms or ill-defined predicates [Dummett] |
| 8179 | The law of excluded middle is the logical reflection of the principle of bivalence [Dummett] |
| 8184 | Philosophers should not presume reality, but only invoke it when language requires it [Dummett] |
| 8185 | We can't make sense of a world not apprehended by a mind [Dummett] |
| 8163 | Since 'no bird here' and 'no squirrel here' seem the same, we must talk of 'atomic' facts [Dummett] |
| 8161 | We know we can state facts, with true statements [Dummett] |
| 8180 | 'That is red or orange' might be considered true, even though 'that is red' and 'that is orange' were not [Dummett] |
| 8178 | Empirical and a priori knowledge are not distinct, but are extremes of a sliding scale [Dummett] |
| 3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
| 8175 | A theory of thought will include propositional attitudes as well as propositions [Dummett] |
| 8174 | The theories of meaning and understanding are the only routes to an account of thought [Dummett] |
| 8165 | To 'abstract from' is a logical process, as opposed to the old mental view [Dummett] |
| 8168 | To know the truth-conditions of a sentence, you must already know the meaning [Dummett] |
| 8181 | A justificationist theory of meaning leads to the rejection of classical logic [Dummett] |
| 8182 | Verificationism could be realist, if we imagined the verification by a superhuman power [Dummett] |
| 8183 | If truths about the past depend on memories and current evidence, the past will change [Dummett] |
| 8176 | We could only guess the meanings of 'true' and 'false' when sentences were used [Dummett] |
| 8170 | Sentences are the primary semantic units, because they can say something [Dummett] |
| 8169 | We can't distinguish a proposition from its content [Dummett] |
| 23529 | Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA] |
| 23530 | The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA] |
| 23522 | In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA] |
| 23528 | The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA] |
| 23523 | The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA] |
| 23524 | Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA] |
| 23521 | Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA] |
| 23525 | Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA] |
| 23526 | Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA] |
| 23527 | Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA] |
| 8186 | Time is the measure of change, so we can't speak of time before all change [Dummett] |
| 8167 | If Presentism is correct, we cannot even say that the present changes [Dummett] |