35 ideas
13252 | Some truths have true negations [Beall/Restall] |
13247 | A truthmaker is an object which entails a sentence [Beall/Restall] |
13249 | (∀x)(A v B) |- (∀x)A v (∃x)B) is valid in classical logic but invalid intuitionistically [Beall/Restall] |
13243 | Excluded middle must be true for some situation, not for all situations [Beall/Restall] |
13242 | It's 'relevantly' valid if all those situations make it true [Beall/Restall] |
13246 | Relevant logic does not abandon classical logic [Beall/Restall] |
13245 | Relevant consequence says invalidity is the conclusion not being 'in' the premises [Beall/Restall] |
13254 | A doesn't imply A - that would be circular [Beall/Restall] |
13255 | Relevant logic may reject transitivity [Beall/Restall] |
13250 | Free logic terms aren't existential; classical is non-empty, with referring names [Beall/Restall] |
13235 | Logic studies consequence; logical truths are consequences of everything, or nothing [Beall/Restall] |
13238 | Syllogisms are only logic when they use variables, and not concrete terms [Beall/Restall] |
13234 | The view of logic as knowing a body of truths looks out-of-date [Beall/Restall] |
13232 | Logic studies arguments, not formal languages; this involves interpretations [Beall/Restall] |
13241 | The model theory of classical predicate logic is mathematics [Beall/Restall] |
13253 | There are several different consequence relations [Beall/Restall] |
13240 | A sentence follows from others if they always model it [Beall/Restall] |
13236 | Logical truth is much more important if mathematics rests on it, as logicism claims [Beall/Restall] |
13237 | Preface Paradox affirms and denies the conjunction of propositions in the book [Beall/Restall] |
22227 | For Sartre there is only being for-itself, or being in-itself (which is beyond experience) [Sartre, by Daigle] |
13244 | Relevant necessity is always true for some situation (not all situations) [Beall/Restall] |
20743 | Appearances do not hide the essence; appearances are the essence [Sartre] |
6151 | Sartre says consciousness is just directedness towards external objects [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
13239 | Judgement is always predicating a property of a subject [Beall/Restall] |
6164 | Sartre rejects mental content, and the idea that the mind has hidden inner features [Sartre, by Rowlands] |
13248 | We can rest truth-conditions on situations, rather than on possible worlds [Beall/Restall] |
13233 | Propositions commit to content, and not to any way of spelling it out [Beall/Restall] |
7074 | Man is a useless passion [Sartre] |
6687 | Man is the desire to be God [Sartre] |
22228 | Sartre's freedom is not for whimsical action, but taking responsibility for our own values [Sartre, by Daigle] |
22233 | Love is the demand to be loved [Sartre] |
20755 | Fear concerns the world, but 'anguish' comes from confronting my self [Sartre] |
20760 | Sincerity is not authenticity, because it only commits to one particular identity [Sartre, by Aho] |
22231 | We flee from the anguish of freedom by seeing ourselves objectively, as determined [Sartre] |