Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Ancient Philosophy: very short introduction' and 'Universal Prescriptivism'

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15 ideas

1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / b. Pre-Socratic philosophy
Xenophanes began the concern with knowledge [Annas]
1. Philosophy / C. History of Philosophy / 2. Ancient Philosophy / c. Classical philosophy
Plato was the first philosopher who was concerned to systematize his ideas [Annas]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Euripides's Medea is a key case of reason versus the passions [Annas]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Virtue is a kind of understanding of moral value [Annas]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]