Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'The Virtues and Human Nature' and 'Subjective View: sec qualities and indexicals'

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26 ideas

7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
22427 To explain object qualities, primary qualities must be more than mere sources of experience [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / b. Primary/secondary
22413 Being red simply consists in looking red [McGinn]
22415 Relativity means differing secondary perceptions are not real disagreements [McGinn]
22416 Phenomenalism is correct for secondary qualities, so scepticism is there impossible [McGinn]
22422 Maybe all possible sense experience must involve both secondary and primary qualities [McGinn]
22428 You understood being red if you know the experience involved; not so with thngs being square [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / c. Primary qualities
22414 You don't need to know how a square thing looks or feels to understand squareness [McGinn]
22423 Touch doesn't provide direct experience of primary qualities, because touch feels temperature [McGinn]
22426 We can perceive objectively, because primary qualities are not mind-created [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
22412 Lockean secondary qualities (unlike primaries) produce particular sensory experiences [McGinn]
22421 Could there be a mind which lacked secondary quality perception? [McGinn]
22424 Secondary qualities contain information; their variety would be superfluous otherwise [McGinn]
22425 The utility theory says secondary qualities give information useful to human beings [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
7629 We see objects 'directly' by representing them [McGinn]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
3102 Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 9. Indexical Thought
22420 The indexical perspective is subjective, incorrigible and constant [McGinn]
18410 Indexical thought is in relation to my self-consciousness [McGinn]
22417 Indexicals do not figure in theories of physics, because they are not explanatory causes [McGinn]
18402 Indexical concepts are indispensable, as we need them for the power to act [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 9. Indexical Semantics
22418 I can know indexical truths a priori, unlike their non-indexical paraphrases [McGinn]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 1. Intention to Act / a. Nature of intentions
23146 Motives produce intentions, which lead to actions [Driver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
23147 Good intentions are not necessary for virtue [Driver]
23144 Virtue should be defined by consequences, not by states of mind [Driver]
23148 Virtues are character traits or dispositions which produce good consequences for others [Driver]
23150 Control of pregnancy and knowledge of paternity have downgraded chastity [Driver]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / a. Virtues
23149 If generosity systematically turned recipients into parasites, it wouldn't be a virtue [Driver]