18 ideas
9376 | A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian] |
9375 | Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian] |
9369 | 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian] |
9367 | The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian] |
9373 | That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian] |
9380 | We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian] |
9384 | We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian] |
9374 | If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian] |
3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
9378 | If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian] |
9377 | 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian] |
9372 | Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian] |
17721 | There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins] |
9368 | Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian] |
23601 | Leaders can only attack foreigners who have done wrong (as with their own subjects) [Vitoria] |
23569 | The only just cause for a war is a wrong received [Vitoria] |
23566 | Princes should not justify a war to their subjects, and doing so would undermine the state [Vitoria] |
23576 | Sacking a city is lawful if it motivates the attacking troops [Vitoria] |