Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Mental Acts: their content and their objects' and 'Definitions'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


29 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definitions usually have a term, a 'definiendum' containing the term, and a defining 'definiens' [Gupta]
Notable definitions have been of piety (Plato), God (Anselm), number (Frege), and truth (Tarski) [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 2. Aims of Definition
A definition needs to apply to the same object across possible worlds [Gupta]
The 'revision theory' says that definitions are rules for improving output [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 3. Types of Definition
Traditional definitions are general identities, which are sentential and reductive [Gupta]
Traditional definitions need: same category, mention of the term, and conservativeness and eliminability [Gupta]
A definition can be 'extensionally', 'intensionally' or 'sense' adequate [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
Chemists aim at real definition of things; lexicographers aim at nominal definition of usage [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
If definitions aim at different ideals, then defining essence is not a unitary activity [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 10. Stipulative Definition
Stipulative definition assigns meaning to a term, ignoring prior meanings [Gupta]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Ostensive definitions look simple, but are complex and barely explicable [Gupta]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 6. Ordering in Sets
The ordered pair <x,y> is defined as the set {{x},{x,y}}, capturing function, not meaning [Gupta]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]