Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Mental Acts: their content and their objects' and 'Plato on Parts and Wholes'

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24 ideas

2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 7. Ad Hominem
15842 An ad hominem refutation is reasonable, if it uses the opponent's assumptions [Harte,V]
4. Formal Logic / G. Formal Mereology / 1. Mereology
15841 Mereology began as a nominalist revolt against the commitments of set theory [Harte,V]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
15858 Traditionally, the four elements are just what persists through change [Harte,V]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
8780 Attributes are functions, not objects; this distinguishes 'square of 2' from 'double of 2' [Geach]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object
15848 Mereology treats constitution as a criterion of identity, as shown in the axiom of extensionality [Harte,V]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / b. Sums of parts
15837 What exactly is a 'sum', and what exactly is 'composition'? [Harte,V]
15839 If something is 'more than' the sum of its parts, is the extra thing another part, or not? [Harte,V]
15838 The problem with the term 'sum' is that it is singular [Harte,V]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
11910 Being 'the same' is meaningless, unless we specify 'the same X' [Geach]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 3. Abstraction by mind
8775 A big flea is a small animal, so 'big' and 'small' cannot be acquired by abstraction [Geach]
8776 We cannot learn relations by abstraction, because their converse must be learned too [Geach]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
3102 Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
2567 You can't define real mental states in terms of behaviour that never happens [Geach]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
2568 Beliefs aren't tied to particular behaviours [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 2. Origin of Concepts / a. Origin of concepts
8781 The mind does not lift concepts from experience; it creates them, and then applies them [Geach]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 5. Concepts and Language / c. Concepts without language
8769 If someone has aphasia but can still play chess, they clearly have concepts [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 3. Abstracta by Ignoring
8770 'Abstractionism' is acquiring a concept by picking out one experience amongst a group [Geach]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 8. Abstractionism Critique
8771 'Or' and 'not' are not to be found in the sensible world, or even in the world of inner experience [Geach]
8772 We can't acquire number-concepts by extracting the number from the things being counted [Geach]
8773 Abstractionists can't explain counting, because it must precede experience of objects [Geach]
8774 The numbers don't exist in nature, so they cannot have been abstracted from there into our languages [Geach]
8778 Blind people can use colour words like 'red' perfectly intelligently [Geach]
8777 If 'black' and 'cat' can be used in the absence of such objects, how can such usage be abstracted? [Geach]
8779 We can form two different abstract concepts that apply to a single unified experience [Geach]