Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Confessions of a Philosopher', 'Morality as system of hypothetical imperatives' and 'Intro to 'Self-Representational Consciousness''

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11 ideas

15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / e. Cause of consciousness
Consciousness is reductively explained either by how it represents, or how it is represented [Kriegel/Williford]
Experiences can be represented consciously or unconsciously, so representation won't explain consciousness [Kriegel/Williford]
Red tomato experiences are conscious if the state represents the tomato and itself [Kriegel/Williford]
How is self-representation possible, does it produce a regress, and is experience like that? [Kriegel/Williford]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / f. Higher-order thought
Unfortunately, higher-order representations could involve error [Kriegel/Williford]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 3. Limits of Introspection
Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / e. Ethical cognitivism
Morality is inescapable, in descriptive words such as 'dishonest', 'unjust' and 'uncharitable' [Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / b. Rational ethics
Reason is not a motivator of morality [Foot, by Hacker-Wright]
Rejecting moral rules may be villainous, but it isn't inconsistent [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Saying we 'ought to be moral' makes no sense, unless it relates to some other system [Foot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
Morality no more consists of categorical imperatives than etiquette does [Foot]