17 ideas
| 9327 | Organisms understand their worlds better if they understand themselves [Gulick] |
| 17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
| 17825 | Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy] |
| 17826 | Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy] |
| 17828 | Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy] |
| 17827 | Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy] |
| 17830 | Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy] |
| 17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
| 17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
| 9325 | In contrast with knowledge, the notion of understanding emphasizes practical engagement [Gulick] |
| 9326 | Knowing-that is a much richer kind of knowing-how [Gulick] |
| 9319 | Is consciousness a type of self-awareness, or is being self-aware a way of being conscious? [Gulick] |
| 9320 | Higher-order theories divide over whether the higher level involves thought or perception [Gulick] |
| 9321 | Higher-order models reduce the problem of consciousness to intentionality [Gulick] |
| 9322 | Maybe qualia only exist at the lower level, and a higher-level is needed for what-it-is-like [Gulick] |
| 3102 | Why don't we experience or remember going to sleep at night? [Magee] |
| 9324 | From the teleopragmatic perspective, life is largely an informational process [Gulick] |