Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Papancasudani', 'talk' and 'Modality'

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27 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 2. Invocation to Philosophy
343 The unexamined life is not worth living for men [Socrates]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 1. On Reason
5750 Consistency is modal, saying propositions are consistent if they could be true together [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / C. Predicate Calculus PC / 1. Predicate Calculus PC
5737 Predicate logic has connectives, quantifiers, variables, predicates, equality, names and brackets [Melia]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
5744 First-order predicate calculus is extensional logic, but quantified modal logic is intensional (hence dubious) [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 5. Second-Order Quantification
5740 Second-order logic needs second-order variables and quantification into predicate position [Melia]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
5741 If every model that makes premises true also makes conclusion true, the argument is valid [Melia]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
5735 Maybe names and predicates can capture any fact [Melia]
5736 No sort of plain language or levels of logic can express modal facts properly [Melia]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
5746 The Identity of Indiscernibles is contentious for qualities, and trivial for non-qualities [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 2. Nature of Necessity
5738 We may be sure that P is necessary, but is it necessarily necessary? [Melia]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 4. De re / De dicto modality
5732 'De re' modality is about things themselves, 'de dicto' modality is about propositions [Melia]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
5739 Sometimes we want to specify in what ways a thing is possible [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
5734 Possible worlds make it possible to define necessity and counterfactuals without new primitives [Melia]
5742 In possible worlds semantics the modal operators are treated as quantifiers [Melia]
5743 If possible worlds semantics is not realist about possible worlds, logic becomes merely formal [Melia]
5749 Possible worlds could be real as mathematics, propositions, properties, or like books [Melia]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / b. Worlds as fictions
5751 The truth of propositions at possible worlds are implied by the world, just as in books [Melia]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
5748 We accept unverifiable propositions because of simplicity, utility, explanation and plausibility [Melia]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
344 If death is like a night of dreamless sleep, such nights are very pleasant [Socrates]
339 Men fear death as a great evil when it may be a great blessing [Socrates]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
2 We should not even harm someone who harms us [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
345 A good man cannot be harmed, either in life or in death [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / c. Justice
346 One ought not to return a wrong or injury to any person, whatever the provocation [Socrates]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 4. External Goods / c. Wealth
341 Wealth is good if it is accompanied by virtue [Socrates]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
347 Will I stand up against the law, simply because I have been unjustly judged? [Socrates]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
7907 Human killing is worse if the victim is virtuous [Buddhaghosa]
28. God / C. Attitudes to God / 5. Atheism
338 Socrates is accused of denying the gods, saying sun is stone and moon is earth [Socrates, by Plato]