19 ideas
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
13489 | Von Neumann treated cardinals as a special sort of ordinal [Neumann, by Hart,WD] |
12336 | A von Neumann ordinal is a transitive set with transitive elements [Neumann, by Badiou] |
18179 | For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than {n}) [Neumann, by Maddy] |
18180 | Von Neumann numbers are preferred, because they continue into the transfinite [Maddy on Neumann] |
15925 | Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors [Neumann, by Lavine] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |