Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Russell's Metaphysical Logic' and 'Essence and Accident'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

18 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 8. Impredicative Definition
21704 'Impredictative' definitions fix a class in terms of the greater class to which it belongs [Linsky,B]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / p. Axiom of Reducibility
21705 Reducibility says any impredicative function has an appropriate predicative replacement [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 2. Descriptions / c. Theory of definite descriptions
21727 Definite descriptions theory eliminates the King of France, but not the Queen of England [Linsky,B]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 5. Extensionalism
21719 Extensionalism means what is true of a function is true of coextensive functions [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
21723 The task of logicism was to define by logic the concepts 'number', 'successor' and '0' [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / b. Type theory
21721 Higher types are needed to distinguished intensional phenomena which are coextensive [Linsky,B]
21703 Types are 'ramified' when there are further differences between the type of quantifier and its range [Linsky,B]
21714 The ramified theory subdivides each type, according to the range of the variables [Linsky,B]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / d. Logicism critique
21713 Did logicism fail, when Russell added three nonlogical axioms, to save mathematics? [Linsky,B]
21715 For those who abandon logicism, standard set theory is a rival option [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
21729 Construct properties as sets of objects, or say an object must be in the set to have the property [Linsky,B]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12312 The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10937 Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
12308 In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
12303 Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7628 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12307 Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
12310 Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]