17 ideas
| 8877 | We can't attain a coherent system by lopping off any beliefs that won't fit [Sosa] |
| 11970 | Logicians like their entities to exhibit a maximum degree of purity [Kaplan] |
| 8884 | The phenomenal concept of an eleven-dot pattern does not include the concept of eleven [Sosa] |
| 11969 | Models nicely separate particulars from their clothing, and logicians often accept that metaphysically [Kaplan] |
| 11971 | The simplest solution to transworld identification is to adopt bare particulars [Kaplan] |
| 11973 | Unusual people may have no counterparts, or several [Kaplan] |
| 11972 | Essence is a transworld heir line, rather than a collection of properties [Kaplan] |
| 8878 | It is acceptable to say a supermarket door 'knows' someone is approaching [Sosa] |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| 8880 | In reducing arithmetic to self-evident logic, logicism is in sympathy with rationalism [Sosa] |
| 8881 | Most of our knowledge has insufficient sensory support [Sosa] |
| 8882 | Perception may involve thin indexical concepts, or thicker perceptual concepts [Sosa] |
| 8883 | Do beliefs only become foundationally justified if we fully attend to features of our experience? [Sosa] |
| 8885 | Some features of a thought are known directly, but others must be inferred [Sosa] |
| 8876 | Much propositional knowledge cannot be formulated, as in recognising a face [Sosa] |
| 8879 | Fully comprehensive beliefs may not be knowledge [Sosa] |
| 11967 | Sentences might have the same sense when logically equivalent - or never have the same sense [Kaplan] |