11 ideas
18073 | Dummett says classical logic rests on meaning as truth, while intuitionist logic rests on assertability [Dummett, by Kitcher] |
19057 | Classical quantification is an infinite conjunction or disjunction - but you may not know all the instances [Dummett] |
18415 | The actual world is just the world you are in [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
16392 | A content is a property, and believing it is self-ascribing that property [Lewis, by Recanati] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
18416 | Attitudes involve properties (not propositions), and belief is self-ascribing the properties [Lewis, by Solomon] |
16390 | Lewis's popular centred worlds approach gives an attitude an index of world, subject and time [Lewis, by Recanati] |
19055 | Stating a sentence's truth-conditions is just paraphrasing the sentence [Dummett] |
19056 | If a sentence is effectively undecidable, we can never know its truth conditions [Dummett] |
18418 | A theory of perspectival de se content gives truth conditions relative to an agent [Lewis, by Cappelen/Dever] |
19054 | Meaning as use puts use beyond criticism, and needs a holistic view of language [Dummett] |