Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Scientific Thought', 'Pref to new 'Materialist Theory'' and 'Why Medieval Philosophy Matters'

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
22138 Science rests on scholastic metaphysics, not on Hume, Kant or Carnap [Boulter]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 2. Need for Universals
22134 Thoughts are general, but the world isn't, so how can we think accurately? [Boulter]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14759 A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
11842 If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
22150 Logical possibility needs the concepts of the proposition to be adequate [Boulter]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / d. Secondary qualities
7440 Secondary qualities are microscopic primary qualities of physical things [Armstrong]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
22139 Experiments don't just observe; they look to see what interventions change the natural order [Boulter]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
22136 Science begins with sufficient reason, de-animation, and the importance of nature [Boulter]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
7437 Consciousness and experience of qualities are not the same [Armstrong]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 1. Faculties
22135 Our concepts can never fully capture reality, but simplification does not falsify [Boulter]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 1. Behaviourism
7434 Behaviourism is false, but mind is definable as the cause of behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 2. Potential Behaviour
7436 The manifestations of a disposition need never actually exist [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 4. Causal Functionalism
7429 Causal Functionalism says mental states are apt for producing behaviour [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / C. Functionalism / 5. Teleological Functionalism
7438 A causal theory of mentality would be improved by a teleological element [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
7431 The identity of mental states with physical properties is contingent, because the laws of nature are contingent [Armstrong]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
7432 One mental role might be filled by a variety of physical types [Armstrong]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
22152 Aristotelians accept the analytic-synthetic distinction [Boulter]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
22156 The facts about human health are the measure of the values in our lives [Boulter]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
8160 The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
14609 We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
22933 We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]