14 ideas
| 13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
| 13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
| 13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
| 13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
| 13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |