Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Conditionals' and 'The Metaphysics of Scientific Realism'

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35 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
12667 Metaphysics aims at the simplest explanation, without regard to testability [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
12666 We can base logic on acceptability, and abandon the Fregean account by truth-preservation [Ellis]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
14352 '¬', '&', and 'v' are truth functions: the truth of the compound is fixed by the truth of the components [Jackson]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 1. Foundations for Mathematics
12688 Mathematics is the formal study of the categorical dimensions of things [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
12683 Objects and substances are a subcategory of the natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
12670 A physical event is any change of distribution of energy [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
12673 Physical properties are those relevant to how a physical system might act [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
12665 I support categorical properties, although most people only want causal powers [Ellis]
12682 Essentialism needs categorical properties (spatiotemporal and numerical relations) and dispositions [Ellis]
12684 Spatial, temporal and numerical relations have causal roles, without being causal [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
12672 Properties and relations are discovered, so they can't be mere sets of individuals [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 2. Powers as Basic
12676 Causal powers can't rest on things which lack causal power [Ellis]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 5. Powers and Properties
23781 Categoricals exist to influence powers. Such as structures, orientations and magnitudes [Ellis, by Williams,NE]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12686 Causal powers are a proper subset of the dispositional properties [Ellis]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 1. Structure of an Object
12685 Categorical properties depend only on the structures they represent [Ellis]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
12679 A real essence is a kind's distinctive properties [Ellis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
12668 Metaphysical necessity holds between things in the world and things they make true [Ellis]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
14360 Possible worlds for subjunctives (and dispositions), and no-truth for indicatives? [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
14353 Modus ponens requires that A→B is F when A is T and B is F [Jackson]
14354 When A and B have the same truth value, A→B is true, because A→A is a logical truth [Jackson]
14355 (A&B)→A is a logical truth, even if antecedent false and consequent true, so it is T if A is F and B is T [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
14358 In the possible worlds account of conditionals, modus ponens and modus tollens are validated [Jackson]
14359 Only assertions have truth-values, and conditionals are not proper assertions [Jackson]
14357 Possible worlds account, unlike A⊃B, says nothing about when A is false [Jackson]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
14356 We can't insist that A is relevant to B, as conditionals can express lack of relevance [Jackson]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12687 Metaphysical necessities are those depending on the essential nature of things [Ellis]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7628 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 2. Aim of Science
12669 Science aims to explain things, not just describe them [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 2. Defining Kinds
12681 There are natural kinds of processes [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 4. Source of Kinds
12680 Natural kind structures go right down to the bottom level [Ellis]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 3. Laws and Generalities
12675 Laws of nature are just descriptions of how things are disposed to behave [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / c. Forces
12671 I deny forces as entities that intervene in causation, but are not themselves causal [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 2. Thermodynamics / a. Energy
12674 Energy is the key multi-valued property, vital to scientific realism [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / a. Absolute time
12689 Simultaneity can be temporal equidistance from the Big Bang [Ellis]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 3. Parts of Time / e. Present moment
12690 The present is the collapse of the light wavefront from the Big Bang [Ellis]