15 ideas
14590 | If we accept scattered objects such as archipelagos, why not think of cars that way? [Hawthorne] |
14591 | Four-dimensionalists say instantaneous objects are more fundamental than long-lived ones [Hawthorne] |
14589 | A modal can reverse meaning if the context is seen differently, so maybe context is all? [Hawthorne] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
19682 | Internalists are much more interested in evidence than externalists are [McGrew] |
19684 | Does spotting a new possibility count as evidence? [McGrew] |
19687 | Absence of evidence proves nothing, and weird claims need special evidence [McGrew] |
19688 | Every event is highly unlikely (in detail), but may be perfectly plausible [McGrew] |
19686 | Criminal law needs two separate witnesses, but historians will accept one witness [McGrew] |
19680 | Maybe all evidence consists of beliefs, rather than of facts [McGrew] |
19681 | If all evidence is propositional, what is the evidence for the proposition? Do we face a regress? [McGrew] |
19689 | Several unreliable witnesses can give good support, if they all say the same thing [McGrew] |
19683 | Narrow evidentialism relies wholly on propositions; the wider form includes other items [McGrew] |
19685 | Falsificationism would be naive if even a slight discrepancy in evidence killed a theory [McGrew] |
14588 | Modern metaphysicians tend to think space-time points are more fundamental than space-time regions [Hawthorne] |