19 ideas
20350 | Metaphysics generalises the data, to get at the ontology [Richardson] |
20349 | Metaphysics aims at the essence of things, and a system to show how this explains other truths [Richardson] |
20351 | Metaphysics needs systems, because analysis just obsesses over details [Richardson] |
17713 | After 1903, Husserl avoids metaphysical commitments [Mares] |
17715 | The truth of the axioms doesn't matter for pure mathematics, but it does for applied [Mares] |
17716 | Mathematics is relations between properties we abstract from experience [Mares] |
17703 | Light in straight lines is contingent a priori; stipulated as straight, because they happen to be so [Mares] |
17714 | Aristotelians dislike the idea of a priori judgements from pure reason [Mares] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
17705 | Empiricists say rationalists mistake imaginative powers for modal insights [Mares] |
17700 | The most popular view is that coherent beliefs explain one another [Mares] |
17704 | Operationalism defines concepts by our ways of measuring them [Mares] |
17710 | Aristotelian justification uses concepts abstracted from experience [Mares] |
17706 | The essence of a concept is either its definition or its conceptual relations? [Mares] |
17701 | Possible worlds semantics has a nice compositional account of modal statements [Mares] |
17702 | Unstructured propositions are sets of possible worlds; structured ones have components [Mares] |
20356 | Humans dominate because, unlike other animals, they have a synthesis of conflicting drives [Richardson] |
20366 | A mind that could see cause and effect as a continuum would deny cause and effect [Richardson] |
17708 | Maybe space has points, but processes always need regions with a size [Mares] |