12 ideas
| 9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
| 9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
| 9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| 9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
| 9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
| 9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
| 9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
| 20508 | How people vote should be on public record, so they can be held accountable [Mill, by Wolff,J] |
| 20507 | Voting is a strict duty, like jury service, and must only be aimed at the public good [Mill] |
| 20505 | Direct democracy is inexperience judging experience, and ignorance judging knowledge [Mill] |
| 20504 | People can only participate in decisions in small communities, so representatives are needed [Mill] |