Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'An Introduction to Political Philosophy (Rev)' and 'Metaphysics: the logical approach'

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59 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics focuses on Platonism, essentialism, materialism and anti-realism [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 5. Linguistic Analysis
There are the 'is' of predication (a function), the 'is' of identity (equals), and the 'is' of existence (quantifier) [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / F. Analytic Philosophy / 7. Limitations of Analysis
Analytical philosophy analyses separate concepts successfully, but lacks a synoptic vision of the results [Benardete,JA]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
Presumably the statements of science are true, but should they be taken literally or not? [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 1. Set Theory
Set theory attempts to reduce the 'is' of predication to mathematics [Benardete,JA]
The set of Greeks is included in the set of men, but isn't a member of it [Benardete,JA]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / a. Axioms for sets
The standard Z-F Intuition version of set theory has about ten agreed axioms [Benardete,JA, by PG]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 2. Geometry
Greeks saw the science of proportion as the link between geometry and arithmetic [Benardete,JA]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 3. Nature of Numbers / b. Types of number
Negatives, rationals, irrationals and imaginaries are all postulated to solve baffling equations [Benardete,JA]
Natural numbers are seen in terms of either their ordinality (Peano), or cardinality (set theory) [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
If slowness is a property of walking rather than the walker, we must allow that events exist [Benardete,JA]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 8. Stuff / a. Pure stuff
Early pre-Socratics had a mass-noun ontology, which was replaced by count-nouns [Benardete,JA]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / d. Forms critiques
If there is no causal interaction with transcendent Platonic objects, how can you learn about them? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
Why should packed-together particles be a thing (Mt Everest), but not scattered ones? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 6. Essence as Unifier
Could a horse lose the essential property of being a horse, and yet continue to exist? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 2. Objects that Change
If a soldier continues to exist after serving as a soldier, does the wind cease to exist after it ceases to blow? [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 8. Continuity of Rivers
One can step into the same river twice, but not into the same water [Benardete,JA]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Absolutists might accept that to exist is relative, but relative to what? How about relative to itself? [Benardete,JA]
Maybe self-identity isn't existence, if Pegasus can be self-identical but non-existent [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 1. Nature of the A Priori
The clearest a priori knowledge is proving non-existence through contradiction [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
If we know truths about prime numbers, we seem to have synthetic a priori knowledge of Platonic objects [Benardete,JA]
Logical positivism amounts to no more than 'there is no synthetic a priori' [Benardete,JA]
Assertions about existence beyond experience can only be a priori synthetic [Benardete,JA]
Appeals to intuition seem to imply synthetic a priori knowledge [Benardete,JA]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / b. The natural life
Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J]
Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / c. Social contract
For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J]
Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J]
Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 2. Leaders / c. Despotism
How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / C. Ruling a State / 3. Government / a. Government
'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 1. Ideology
Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 2. Anarchism
A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J]
It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 4. Social Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / a. Nature of democracy
A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J]
Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J]
Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J]
A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / b. Consultation
We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J]
Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 4. Free market
Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J]
Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J]
Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J]
If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J]
If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Rationalists see points as fundamental, but empiricists prefer regions [Benardete,JA]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / a. Ontological Proof
In the ontological argument a full understanding of the concept of God implies a contradiction in 'There is no God' [Benardete,JA]