21 ideas
9193 | ZF set theory has variables which range over sets, 'equals' and 'member', and extensionality [Dummett] |
9194 | The main alternative to ZF is one which includes looser classes as well as sets [Dummett] |
9195 | Intuitionists reject excluded middle, not for a third value, but for possibility of proof [Dummett] |
9186 | First-order logic concerns objects; second-order adds properties, kinds, relations and functions [Dummett] |
9187 | Logical truths and inference are characterized either syntactically or semantically [Dummett] |
9191 | Ordinals seem more basic than cardinals, since we count objects in sequence [Dummett] |
9192 | The number 4 has different positions in the naturals and the wholes, with the same structure [Dummett] |
14193 | 'Substance theorists' take modal properties as primitive, without structure, just falling under a sortal [Paul,LA] |
14195 | If an object's sort determines its properties, we need to ask what determines its sort [Paul,LA] |
14196 | Substance essentialism says an object is multiple, as falling under various different sortals [Paul,LA] |
14198 | Absolutely unrestricted qualitative composition would allow things with incompatible properties [Paul,LA] |
14190 | Deep essentialist objects have intrinsic properties that fix their nature; the shallow version makes it contextual [Paul,LA] |
14191 | Deep essentialists say essences constrain how things could change; modal profiles fix natures [Paul,LA] |
14192 | Essentialism must deal with charges of arbitrariness, and failure to reduce de re modality [Paul,LA] |
14197 | An object's modal properties don't determine its possibilities [Paul,LA] |
14759 | A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad] |
11842 | If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad] |
14189 | 'Modal realists' believe in many concrete worlds, 'actualists' in just this world, 'ersatzists' in abstract other worlds [Paul,LA] |
8160 | The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett] |
14609 | We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad] |
22933 | We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad] |