Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Philosophy as a way of life' and 'Universal Prescriptivism'

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14 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 6. Hopes for Philosophy
9198 It is no longer possible to be a sage, but we can practice the exercise of wisdom [Hadot]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 2. Logos
9197 The logos represents a demand for universal rationality [Hadot]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7628 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
2705 How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
2712 You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2706 Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
2709 Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
2704 If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
2703 Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
2707 If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
2708 An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
2711 Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
9196 The pleasure of existing is the only genuine pleasure [Hadot]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
2710 Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]