14 ideas
10633 | 'Some critics admire only one another' cannot be paraphrased in singular first-order [Linnebo] |
15102 | S4 says there must be some necessary truths (the actual ones, of which there is at least one) [Cameron] |
10638 | A pure logic is wholly general, purely formal, and directly known [Linnebo] |
10635 | Second-order quantification and plural quantification are different [Linnebo] |
10641 | Traditionally we eliminate plurals by quantifying over sets [Linnebo] |
10640 | Instead of complex objects like tables, plurally quantify over mereological atoms tablewise [Linnebo] |
10636 | Plural plurals are unnatural and need a first-level ontology [Linnebo] |
10639 | Plural quantification may allow a monadic second-order theory with first-order ontology [Linnebo] |
10643 | We speak of a theory's 'ideological commitments' as well as its 'ontological commitments' [Linnebo] |
10637 | Ordinary speakers posit objects without concern for ontology [Linnebo] |
15103 | Blackburn fails to show that the necessary cannot be grounded in the contingent [Cameron] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
10634 | Predicates are 'distributive' or 'non-distributive'; do individuals do what the group does? [Linnebo] |
15104 | The 'moving spotlight' theory makes one time privileged, while all times are on a par ontologically [Cameron] |