31 ideas
| 9408 | Science studies phenomena, but only metaphysics tells us what exists [Mumford] |
| 9429 | Many forms of reasoning, such as extrapolation and analogy, are useful but deductively invalid [Mumford] |
| 9427 | For Humeans the world is a world primarily of events [Mumford] |
| 9446 | Properties are just natural clusters of powers [Mumford] |
| 9435 | A 'porridge' nominalist thinks we just divide reality in any way that suits us [Mumford] |
| 9447 | If properties are clusters of powers, this can explain why properties resemble in degrees [Mumford] |
| 12248 | How can we show that a universally possessed property is an essential property? [Mumford] |
| 7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
| 19269 | 'Quus' means the same as 'plus' if the ingredients are less than 57; otherwise it just produces 5 [Kripke] |
| 19271 | No rule can be fully explained [Kripke] |
| 7305 | Kripke's Wittgenstein says meaning 'vanishes into thin air' [Kripke, by Miller,A] |
| 19270 | If you ask what is in your mind for following the addition rule, meaning just seems to vanish [Kripke] |
| 11076 | Community implies assertability-conditions rather than truth-conditions semantics [Kripke, by Hanna] |
| 11075 | The sceptical rule-following paradox is the basis of the private language argument [Kripke, by Hanna] |
| 9430 | Singular causes, and identities, might be necessary without falling under a law [Mumford] |
| 9445 | We can give up the counterfactual account if we take causal language at face value [Mumford] |
| 9443 | It is only properties which are the source of necessity in the world [Mumford] |
| 9444 | There are four candidates for the logical form of law statements [Mumford] |
| 9416 | Regularities are more likely with few instances, and guaranteed with no instances! [Mumford] |
| 9415 | Would it count as a regularity if the only five As were also B? [Mumford] |
| 9431 | Pure regularities are rare, usually only found in idealized conditions [Mumford] |
| 9441 | Regularity laws don't explain, because they have no governing role [Mumford] |
| 9421 | The best systems theory says regularities derive from laws, rather than constituting them [Mumford] |
| 9422 | If the best system describes a nomological system, the laws are in nature, not in the description [Mumford] |
| 9432 | Laws of nature are necessary relations between universal properties, rather than about particulars [Mumford] |
| 9433 | If laws can be uninstantiated, this favours the view of them as connecting universals [Mumford] |
| 9434 | Laws of nature are just the possession of essential properties by natural kinds [Mumford] |
| 9437 | To distinguish accidental from essential properties, we must include possible members of kinds [Mumford] |
| 9411 | There are no laws of nature in Aristotle; they became standard with Descartes and Newton [Mumford] |
| 9439 | The Central Dilemma is how to explain an internal or external view of laws which govern [Mumford] |
| 9412 | You only need laws if you (erroneously) think the world is otherwise inert [Mumford] |