8 ideas
10838 | To explain a concept, we need its purpose, not just its rules of usage [Dummett] |
10837 | It is part of the concept of truth that we aim at making true statements [Dummett] |
10840 | We must be able to specify truths in a precise language, like winning moves in a game [Dummett] |
19171 | Tarski's truth is like rules for winning games, without saying what 'winning' means [Dummett, by Davidson] |
20660 | At one level maths and nature are very similar, suggesting some deeper origin [Wolfram] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
10839 | You can't infer a dog's abstract concepts from its behaviour [Dummett] |
20659 | Space and its contents seem to be one stuff - so space is the only existing thing [Wolfram] |