Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World' and 'Why Propositions cannot be concrete'

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7 ideas

12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
Causation produces productive mechanisms; to understand the world, understand these mechanisms [Salmon]
Salmon's interaction mechanisms needn't be regular, or involving any systems [Glennan on Salmon]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 1. Abstract Thought
The idea of abstract objects is not ontological; it comes from the epistemological idea of abstraction [Plantinga]
Theists may see abstract objects as really divine thoughts [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 3. Concrete Propositions
If propositions are concrete they don't have to exist, and so they can't be necessary truths [Plantinga]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
Propositions can't just be in brains, because 'there are no human beings' might be true [Plantinga]