Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Mind and Its Place in Nature', 'The Scope and Language of Science' and 'What is it like to be a bat?'

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9 ideas

6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
8463 Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
8461 The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
7628 Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
3286 An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3288 Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
4883 Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
3287 We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 6. Conceptual Dualism
8462 A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
4989 Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]