9 ideas
8463 | Maths can be reduced to logic and set theory [Quine] |
8461 | The category of objects incorporates the old distinction of substances and their modes [Quine] |
7628 | Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund] |
3286 | An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel] |
3288 | Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel] |
4883 | Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel] |
3287 | We can't be objective about experience [Nagel] |
8462 | A hallucination can, like an ague, be identified with its host; the ontology is physical, the idiom mental [Quine] |
4989 | Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel] |