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All the ideas for 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori', 'Logical Properties' and 'A Survey of Metaphysics'

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92 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 4. Metaphysics as Science
Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 6. Metaphysics as Conceptual
Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 2. Positivism
If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 1. Definitions
Definitions identify two concepts, so they presuppose identity [McGinn]
2. Reason / F. Fallacies / 2. Infinite Regress
Regresses are only vicious in the context of an explanation [McGinn]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 4. Uses of Truth
Truth is a method of deducing facts from propositions [McGinn]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
'Snow does not fall' corresponds to snow does fall [McGinn]
The idea of truth is built into the idea of correspondence [McGinn]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
The coherence theory of truth implies idealism, because facts are just coherent beliefs [McGinn]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
Truth is the property of propositions that makes it possible to deduce facts [McGinn]
Without the disquotation device for truth, you could never form beliefs from others' testimony [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 4. Identity in Logic
In 'x is F and x is G' we must assume the identity of x in the two statements [McGinn]
Both non-contradiction and excluded middle need identity in their formulation [McGinn]
Identity is unitary, indefinable, fundamental and a genuine relation [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
The quantifier is overrated as an analytical tool [McGinn]
Existential quantifiers just express the quantity of things, leaving existence to the predicate 'exists' [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 3. Objectual Quantification
'Partial quantifier' would be a better name than 'existential quantifier', as no existence would be implied [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
We need an Intentional Quantifier ("some of the things we talk about.."), so existence goes into the proposition [McGinn]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 1. Mathematics
It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 1. Mathematical Platonism / a. For mathematical platonism
If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 1. Nature of Existence
Existence is a primary quality, non-existence a secondary quality [McGinn]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 6. Criterion for Existence
Existence can't be analysed as instantiating a property, as instantiation requires existence [McGinn]
We can't analyse the sentence 'something exists' in terms of instantiated properties [McGinn]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 1. Nature of Change
Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe]
Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / a. Nature of events
Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / b. Events as primitive
Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 4. Events / c. Reduction of events
Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe]
Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 3. Reality
If causal power is the test for reality, that will exclude necessities and possibilities [McGinn]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
Facts are object-plus-extension, or property-plus-set-of-properties, or object-plus-property [McGinn]
7. Existence / E. Categories / 3. Proposed Categories
The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe]
Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe]
Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / b. Nominalism about universals
Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 3. Predicate Nominalism
'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 5. Class Nominalism
If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 6. Nihilism about Objects
Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe]
If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe]
A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 1. Concept of Identity
Identity propositions are not always tautological, and have a key epistemic role [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 2. Defining Identity
Identity is as basic as any concept could ever be [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 4. Type Identity
Type-identity is close similarity in qualities [McGinn]
Qualitative identity is really numerical identity of properties [McGinn]
Qualitative identity can be analysed into numerical identity of the type involved [McGinn]
It is best to drop types of identity, and speak of 'identity' or 'resemblance' [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
Existence is a property of all objects, but less universal than self-identity, which covers even conceivable objects [McGinn]
Sherlock Holmes does not exist, but he is self-identical [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
All identity is necessary, though identity statements can be contingently true [McGinn]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 7. Indiscernible Objects
Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
Leibniz's Law says 'x = y iff for all P, Px iff Py' [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law is so fundamental that it almost defines the concept of identity [McGinn]
Leibniz's Law presupposes the notion of property identity [McGinn]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Modality is not objects or properties, but the type of binding of objects to properties [McGinn]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / b. Impossible worlds
If 'possible' is explained as quantification across worlds, there must be possible worlds [McGinn]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Necessity and possibility are big threats to the empiricist view of knowledge [McGinn]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 1. Scepticism
Scepticism about reality is possible because existence isn't part of appearances [McGinn]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 6. Falsification
Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / d. Explaining people
The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 5. Abstracta by Negation
The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe]
Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 5. Fregean Semantics
Semantics should not be based on set-membership, but on instantiation of properties in objects [McGinn]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 7. Extensional Semantics
Clearly predicates have extensions (applicable objects), but are the extensions part of their meaning? [McGinn]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 5. Direction of causation
If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe]
The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / c. Conditions of causation
Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / b. Nomological causation
Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 9. General Causation / d. Causal necessity
Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 3. Points in Space
Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 5. Relational Space
If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
If Satan is the most imperfect conceivable being, he must have non-existence [McGinn]
I think the fault of the Ontological Argument is taking the original idea to be well-defined [McGinn]