Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori', 'Why Constitution is not Identity' and 'Meaning'

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16 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic

9358	There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]

5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle

9357	Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]

5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names

9364	Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay

16078

Clay is intrinsically and atomically the same as statue (and that lacks 'modal properties') [Rudder Baker]

16077

The clay is not a statue - it borrows that property from the statue it constitutes [Rudder Baker]

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects

16080

Is it possible for two things that are identical to become two separate things? [Rudder Baker]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 6. Constitution of an Object

16076

Constitution is not identity, as consideration of essential predicates shows [Rudder Baker]

16081

The constitution view gives a unified account of the relation of persons/bodies, statues/bronze etc [Rudder Baker]

16082

Statues essentially have relational properties lacked by lumps [Rudder Baker]

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity

9362	Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]

12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention

9365	We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]

18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection

9361	We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]

19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 3. Meaning as Speaker's Intention

7751	Meaning needs an intention to induce a belief, and a recognition that this is the speaker's intention [Grice]

7752	Only the utterer's primary intention is relevant to the meaning [Grice]

7753	We judge linguistic intentions rather as we judge non-linguistic intentions, so they are alike [Grice]

26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism

9363	Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]