Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Pragmatic Conception of the A Priori', 'No Understanding without Explanation' and 'Lewis: reduction of mind (on himself)'

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22 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 1. Argument
Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
There are several logics, none of which will ever derive falsehoods from truth [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
Excluded middle is just our preference for a simplified dichotomy in experience [Lewis,CI]
5. Theory of Logic / F. Referring in Logic / 1. Naming / a. Names
Names represent a uniformity in experience, or they name nothing [Lewis,CI]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 11. Denial of Necessity
Necessary truths are those we will maintain no matter what [Lewis,CI]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Scientific understanding is always the grasping of a correct explanation [Strevens]
We may 'understand that' the cat is on the mat, but not at all 'understand why' it is there [Strevens]
Understanding is a precondition, comes in degrees, is active, and holistic - unlike explanation [Strevens]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 7. A Priori from Convention
We can maintain a priori principles come what may, but we can also change them [Lewis,CI]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 1. Mind / b. Purpose of mind
A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 1. Physical Mind
Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 2. Reduction of Mind
I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis]
18. Thought / B. Mechanics of Thought / 4. Language of Thought
Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis]
Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis]
A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis]
Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 2. Abstracta by Selection
We have to separate the mathematical from physical phenomena by abstraction [Lewis,CI]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Science seeks classification which will discover laws, essences, and predictions [Lewis,CI]