30 ideas
| 18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 17824 | The master science is physical objects divided into sets [Maddy] |
| 17825 | Set theory (unlike the Peano postulates) can explain why multiplication is commutative [Maddy] |
| 17826 | Standardly, numbers are said to be sets, which is neat ontology and epistemology [Maddy] |
| 17828 | Numbers are properties of sets, just as lengths are properties of physical objects [Maddy] |
| 17827 | Sets exist where their elements are, but numbers are more like universals [Maddy] |
| 17830 | Number theory doesn't 'reduce' to set theory, because sets have number properties [Maddy] |
| 17823 | If mathematical objects exist, how can we know them, and which objects are they? [Maddy] |
| 17829 | Number words are unusual as adjectives; we don't say 'is five', and numbers always come first [Maddy] |
| 18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
| 7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
| 7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
| 7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
| 18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |