46 ideas
| 15845 | It seems absurd that seeing a person's limbs, the one is many, and yet the many are one [Plato] |
| 9867 | It is absurd to define a circle, but not be able to recognise a real one [Plato] |
| 9865 | Daily arithmetic counts unequal things, but pure arithmetic equalises them [Plato] |
| 4986 | A weaker kind of reductionism than direct translation is the use of 'bridge laws' [Kirk,R] |
| 14503 | If a mixture does not contain measure and proportion, it is corrupted and destroyed [Plato] |
| 15857 | Any mixture which lacks measure and proportion doesn't even count as a mixture at all [Plato] |
| 4447 | If the good is one, is it unchanged when it is in particulars, and is it then separated from itself? [Plato] |
| 15856 | A thing can become one or many, depending on how we talk about it [Plato] |
| 374 | If one object is divided into its parts, someone can then say that one are many and many is one [Plato] |
| 389 | How can you be certain about aspects of the world if they aren't constant? [Plato] |
| 7301 | The phenomenalist says that to be is to be perceivable [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7302 | Linguistic phenomenalism says we can eliminate talk of physical objects [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7303 | If we lack enough sense-data, are we to say that parts of reality are 'indeterminate'? [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7299 | Primary qualities can be described mathematically, unlike secondary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7300 | An object cannot remain an object without its primary qualities [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 7297 | My justifications might be very coherent, but totally unconnected to the world [Cardinal/Hayward/Jones] |
| 5001 | Maybe we should see intentionality and consciousness as a single problem, not two [Kirk,R] |
| 4993 | If a bird captures a worm, we could say its behaviour is 'about' the worm [Kirk,R] |
| 5000 | Behaviourism says intentionality is an external relation; language of thought says it's internal [Kirk,R] |
| 4982 | Dualism implies some brain events with no physical cause, and others with no physical effect [Kirk,R] |
| 4991 | Behaviourism seems a good theory for intentional states, but bad for phenomenal ones [Kirk,R] |
| 4994 | Behaviourism offers a good alternative to simplistic unitary accounts of mental relationships [Kirk,R] |
| 4992 | In 'holistic' behaviourism we say a mental state is a complex of many dispositions [Kirk,R] |
| 4990 | The inverted spectrum idea is often regarded as an objection to behaviourism [Kirk,R] |
| 4984 | All meaningful psychological statements can be translated into physics [Kirk,R] |
| 4998 | Instead of representation by sentences, it can be by a distribution of connectionist strengths [Kirk,R] |
| 4985 | If mental states are multiply realisable, they could not be translated into physical terms [Kirk,R] |
| 4997 | It seems unlikely that most concepts are innate, if a theory must be understood to grasp them [Kirk,R] |
| 4999 | For behaviourists language is just a special kind of behaviour [Kirk,R] |
| 4995 | Behaviourists doubt whether reference is a single type of relation [Kirk,R] |
| 390 | If goodness involves moderation and proportion, then it seems to be found in beauty [Plato] |
| 391 | The good involves beauty, proportion and truth [Plato] |
| 392 | Neither intellect nor pleasure are the good, because they are not perfect and self-sufficient [Plato] |
| 393 | Good first, then beauty, then reason, then knowledge, then pleasure [Plato, by PG] |
| 385 | Some of the pleasures and pains we feel are false [Plato] |
| 387 | A small pure pleasure is much finer than a large one contaminated with pain [Plato] |
| 373 | Pleasure is certainly very pleasant, but it doesn't follow that all pleasures are good [Plato] |
| 379 | The good must be sufficient and perfect, and neither intellect nor pleasure are that [Plato] |
| 371 | Reason, memory, truth and wisdom are far better than pleasure, for those who can attain them [Plato] |
| 376 | Would you prefer a life of pleasure without reason, or one of reason without pleasure? [Plato] |
| 382 | It is unlikely that the gods feel either pleasure or pain [Plato] |
| 381 | We feel pleasure when we approach our natural state of harmony [Plato] |
| 386 | Intense pleasure and pain are not felt in a good body, but in a worthless one [Plato] |
| 377 | If you lived a life of maximum pleasure, would you still be lacking anything? [Plato] |
| 378 | A life of pure pleasure with no intellect is the life of a jellyfish [Plato] |
| 388 | Hedonists must say that someone in pain is bad, even if they are virtuous [Plato] |