51 ideas
2666 | Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero] |
4588 | There is no such thing as 'science'; there are just many different sciences [Heil] |
21390 | Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades] |
21672 | We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero] |
4616 | A higher level is 'supervenient' if it is determined by lower levels, but has its own natural laws [Heil] |
4603 | Functionalists in Fodor's camp usually say that a genuine property is one that figures in some causal laws [Heil] |
4617 | A stone does not possess the property of being a stone; its other properties make it a stone [Heil] |
4612 | Complex properties are just arrangements of simple properties; they do not "emerge" as separate [Heil] |
4615 | Complex properties are not new properties, they are merely new combinations of properties [Heil] |
4587 | From the property predicates P and Q, we can get 'P or Q', but it doesn't have to designate another property [Heil] |
10464 | A trope is a bit of a property or relation (not an exemplification or a quality) [Bacon,John] |
10465 | Trope theory is ontologically parsimonious, with possibly only one-category [Bacon,John] |
10467 | Individuals consist of 'compresent' tropes [Bacon,John] |
4611 | The supporters of 'tropes' treat objects as bundles of tropes, when I think objects 'possess' properties [Heil] |
4592 | If you can have the boat without its current planks, and the planks with no boat, the planks aren't the boat [Heil] |
15825 | Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm] |
21389 | Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades] |
4586 | You can't embrace the formal apparatus of possible worlds, but reject the ontology [Heil] |
10466 | Maybe possible worlds are just sets of possible tropes [Bacon,John] |
4591 | Idealism explains appearances by identifying appearances with reality [Heil] |
4610 | Different generations focus on either the quality of mind, or its scientific standing, or the content of thought [Heil] |
4618 | If minds are realised materially, it looks as if the material laws will pre-empt any causal role for mind [Heil] |
4621 | Whatever exists has qualities, so it is no surprise that states of minds have qualities [Heil] |
4623 | Propositional attitudes are not the only intentional states; there is also mental imagery [Heil] |
4626 | The widespread externalist view says intentionality has content because of causal links of agent to world [Heil] |
4622 | Error must be possible in introspection, because error is possible in all judgements [Heil] |
21671 | Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero] |
21391 | Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero] |
21674 | Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero] |
4590 | If causation is just regularities in events, the interaction of mind and body is not a special problem [Heil] |
4614 | Disposition is a fundamental feature of reality, since basic particles are capable of endless possible interactions [Heil] |
4595 | No mental state entails inevitable behaviour, because other beliefs or desires may intervene [Heil] |
4599 | Hearts are material, but functionalism says the property of being a heart is not a material property [Heil] |
4624 | If you are a functionalist, there appears to be no room for qualia [Heil] |
4601 | Higher-level sciences cannot be reduced, because their concepts mark boundaries invisible at lower levels [Heil] |
4602 | Higher-level sciences designate real properties of objects, which are not reducible to lower levels [Heil] |
4593 | 'Property dualism' says mind and body are not substances, but distinct families of properties [Heil] |
4597 | Early identity theory talked of mind and brain 'processes', but now the focus is properties [Heil] |
4609 | It seems contradictory to be asked to believe that we can be eliminativist about beliefs [Heil] |
4596 | The appeal of the identity theory is its simplicity, and its solution to the mental causation problem [Heil] |
4598 | Functionalists emphasise that mental processes are not to be reduced to what realises them [Heil] |
4619 | 'Multiple realisability' needs to clearly distinguish low-level realisers from what is realised [Heil] |
4620 | Multiple realisability is not a relation among properties, but an application of predicates to resembling things [Heil] |
4594 | A scientist could know everything about the physiology of headaches, but never have had one [Heil] |
4625 | Is mental imagery pictorial, or is it propositional? [Heil] |
4607 | Folk psychology and neuroscience are no more competitors than cartography and geology are [Heil] |
4605 | Truth-conditions correspond to the idea of 'literal meaning' [Heil] |
4606 | To understand 'birds warble' and 'tigers growl', you must also understand 'tigers warble' [Heil] |
4604 | If propositions are abstract entities, how do human beings interact with them? [Heil] |
7398 | Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck] |
21392 | People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius] |