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All the ideas for 'fragments/reports', 'There is No A Priori (and reply)' and 'What is the Source of Knowledge of Modal Truths?'

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31 ideas

1. Philosophy / D. Nature of Philosophy / 3. Philosophy Defined
Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 6. Definition by Essence
A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe]
Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe]
An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe]
2. Reason / D. Definition / 11. Ostensive Definition
Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades]
We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe]
The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 4. Essence as Definition
Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 14. Knowledge of Essences
If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 6. Identity between Objects
Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 3. Types of Necessity
Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades]
Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 6. Necessity from Essence
If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe]
Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
How could the mind have a link to the necessary character of reality? [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
Some knowledge must be empirical; naturalism implies that all knowledge is like that [Devitt]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / b. Fate
Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 1. Concepts / a. Nature of concepts
A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / a. Direct reference
Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / i. Self-interest
Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 1. Basis of justice
People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / e. Anti scientific essentialism
H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe]