89 ideas
| 2666 | Carneades' pinnacles of philosophy are the basis of knowledge (the criterion of truth) and the end of appetite (good) [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| 19917 | Without reason and human help, human life is misery [Spinoza] |
| 21390 | Future events are true if one day we will say 'this event is happening now' [Carneades] |
| 21672 | We say future things are true that will possess actuality at some following time [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| 14562 | A process is unified as an expression of a collection of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14541 | Events are essentially changes; property exemplifications are just states of affairs [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14553 | Weak emergence is just unexpected, and strong emergence is beyond all deduction [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14538 | Powers explain properties, causes, modality, events, and perhaps even particulars [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14555 | Powers offer no more explanation of nature than laws do [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14557 | Powers are not just basic forces, since they combine to make new powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14583 | Dispositionality is a natural selection function, picking outcomes from the range of possibilities [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14536 | We say 'power' and 'disposition' are equivalent, but some say dispositions are manifestable [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14584 | The simple conditional analysis of dispositions doesn't allow for possible prevention [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14582 | Might dispositions be reduced to normativity, or to intentionality? [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14542 | If statue and clay fall and crush someone, the event is not overdetermined [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14535 | Pandispositionalists say structures are clusters of causal powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14561 | Perdurantism imposes no order on temporal parts, so sequences of events are contingent [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 15825 | Carneades denied the transitivity of identity [Carneades, by Chisholm] |
| 14579 | Dispositionality is the core modality, with possibility and necessity as its extreme cases [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14580 | Dispositions may suggest modality to us - as what might not have been, and what could have been [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 21389 | Carneades distinguished logical from causal necessity, when talking of future events [Long on Carneades] |
| 14552 | Relations are naturally necessary when they are generated by the essential mechanisms of the world [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14578 | Possibility might be non-contradiction, or recombinations of the actual, or truth in possible worlds [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14549 | Maybe truths are necessitated by the facts which are their truthmakers [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14585 | We have more than five senses; balance and proprioception, for example [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14576 | Smoking disposes towards cancer; smokers without cancer do not falsify this claim [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14551 | If causation were necessary, the past would fix the future, and induction would be simple [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14571 | The only full uniformities in nature occur from the essences of fundamental things [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14570 | Nature is not completely uniform, and some regular causes sometimes fail to produce their effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14569 | It is tempting to think that only entailment provides a full explanation [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14568 | A structure won't give a causal explanation unless we know the powers of the structure [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 21671 | Voluntary motion is intrinsically within our power, and this power is its cause [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| 19922 | People are only free if they are guided entirely by reason [Spinoza] |
| 21391 | Some actions are within our power; determinism needs prior causes for everything - so it is false [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| 21674 | Even Apollo can only foretell the future when it is naturally necessary [Carneades, by Cicero] |
| 14556 | Strong emergence seems to imply top-down causation, originating in consciousness [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 7398 | Carneades said that after a shipwreck a wise man would seize the only plank by force [Carneades, by Tuck] |
| 19935 | Peoples are created by individuals, not by nature, and only distinguished by language and law [Spinoza] |
| 19914 | In nature everything has an absolute right to do anything it is capable of doing [Spinoza] |
| 19915 | Natural rights are determined by desire and power, not by reason [Spinoza] |
| 7487 | Society exists to extend human awareness [Spinoza, by Watson] |
| 19943 | The state aims to allow personal development, so its main purpose is freedom [Spinoza] |
| 19930 | Sovereignty must include the power to make people submit to it [Spinoza] |
| 19936 | Kings tend to fight wars for glory, rather than for peace and liberty [Spinoza] |
| 19940 | Deposing a monarch is dangerous, because the people are used to royal authority [Spinoza] |
| 19937 | Monarchs are always proud, and can't back down [Spinoza] |
| 19931 | Every state is more frightened of its own citizens than of external enemies [Spinoza] |
| 19920 | Democracy is a legitimate gathering of people who do whatever they can do [Spinoza] |
| 19938 | Allowing religious ministers any control of the state is bad for both parties [Spinoza] |
| 19933 | If religion is law, then piety is justice, impiety is crime, and non-believers must leave [Spinoza] |
| 19923 | Slavery is not just obedience, but acting only in the interests of the master [Spinoza] |
| 19939 | Government is oppressive if opinions can be crimes, because people can't give them up [Spinoza] |
| 19944 | Without liberty of thought there is no trust in the state, and corruption follows [Spinoza] |
| 19942 | Treason may be committed as much by words as by deeds [Spinoza] |
| 19924 | The freest state is a rational one, where people can submit themselves to reason [Spinoza] |
| 7827 | Spinoza wanted democracy based on individual rights, and is thus the first modern political philosopher [Stewart,M on Spinoza] |
| 19926 | The sovereignty has absolute power over citizens [Spinoza] |
| 19918 | Forming a society meant following reason, and giving up dangerous appetites and mutual harm [Spinoza] |
| 19919 | People only give up their rights, and keep promises, if they hope for some greater good [Spinoza] |
| 19921 | Once you have given up your rights, there is no going back [Spinoza] |
| 19925 | In democracy we don't abandon our rights, but transfer them to the majority of us [Spinoza] |
| 19928 | No one, in giving up their power and right, ceases to be a human being [Spinoza] |
| 19929 | Everyone who gives up their rights must fear the recipients of them [Spinoza] |
| 19932 | The early Hebrews, following Moses, gave up their rights to God alone [Spinoza] |
| 21392 | People change laws for advantage; either there is no justice, or it is a form of self-injury [Carneades, by Lactantius] |
| 19916 | The order of nature does not prohibit anything, and allows whatever appetite produces [Spinoza] |
| 19927 | State and religious law can clash, so the state must make decisions about religion [Spinoza] |
| 14566 | Causation by absence is not real causation, but part of our explanatory practices [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14577 | Causation may not be transitive. Does a fire cause itself to be extinguished by the sprinklers? [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14563 | Causation is the passing around of powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14587 | We take causation to be primitive, as it is hard to see how it could be further reduced [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14533 | Causation doesn't have two distinct relata; it is a single unfolding process [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14558 | A collision is a process, which involves simultaneous happenings, but not instantaneous ones [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14559 | Does causation need a third tying ingredient, or just two that meet, or might there be a single process? [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14565 | Sugar dissolving is a process taking time, not one event and then another [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14567 | Privileging one cause is just an epistemic or pragmatic matter, not an ontological one [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14537 | Coincidence is conjunction without causation; smoking causing cancer is the reverse [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14572 | Is a cause because of counterfactual dependence, or is the dependence because there is a cause? [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14573 | Occasionally a cause makes no difference (pre-emption, perhaps) so the counterfactual is false [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14574 | Cases of preventing a prevention may give counterfactual dependence without causation [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14539 | Nature can be interfered with, so a cause never necessitates its effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14550 | We assert causes without asserting that they necessitate their effects [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14546 | Necessary causation should survive antecedent strengthening, but no cause can always survive that [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14575 | A 'ceteris paribus' clause implies that a conditional only has dispositional force [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14548 | There may be necessitation in the world, but causation does not supply it [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14554 | Laws are nothing more than descriptions of the behaviour of powers [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 14564 | If laws are equations, cause and effect must be simultaneous (or the law would be falsified)! [Mumford/Anjum] |
| 19934 | Hebrews were very hostile to other states, who had not given up their rights to God [Spinoza] |
| 4300 | The Bible has nothing in common with reasoning and philosophy [Spinoza] |