33 ideas
17729 | Examining concepts can recover information obtained through the senses [Jenkins] |
9821 | A definition need not capture the sense of an expression - just get the reference right [Frege, by Dummett] |
17740 | Instead of correspondence of proposition to fact, look at correspondence of its parts [Jenkins] |
9585 | Since every definition is an equation, one cannot define equality itself [Frege] |
17446 | Counting rests on one-one correspondence, of numerals to objects [Frege] |
9582 | Husserl rests sameness of number on one-one correlation, forgetting the correlation with numbers themselves [Frege] |
17730 | Combining the concepts of negation and finiteness gives the concept of infinity [Jenkins] |
9586 | In a number-statement, something is predicated of a concept [Frege] |
9580 | Our concepts recognise existing relations, they don't change them [Frege] |
9589 | Numbers are not real like the sea, but (crucially) they are still objective [Frege] |
17719 | Arithmetic concepts are indispensable because they accurately map the world [Jenkins] |
17717 | Senses produce concepts that map the world, and arithmetic is known through these concepts [Jenkins] |
9577 | The naïve view of number is that it is like a heap of things, or maybe a property of a heap [Frege] |
17724 | It is not easy to show that Hume's Principle is analytic or definitive in the required sense [Jenkins] |
17727 | We can learn about the world by studying the grounding of our concepts [Jenkins] |
17720 | There's essential, modal, explanatory, conceptual, metaphysical and constitutive dependence [Jenkins, by PG] |
9578 | If objects are just presentation, we get increasing abstraction by ignoring their properties [Frege] |
17728 | The concepts we have to use for categorising are ones which map the real world well [Jenkins] |
17726 | Examining accurate, justified or grounded concepts brings understanding of the world [Jenkins] |
17734 | It is not enough that intuition be reliable - we need to know why it is reliable [Jenkins] |
17723 | Knowledge is true belief which can be explained just by citing the proposition believed [Jenkins] |
9581 | Many people have the same thought, which is the component, not the private presentation [Frege] |
17739 | The physical effect of world on brain explains the concepts we possess [Jenkins] |
17718 | Grounded concepts are trustworthy maps of the world [Jenkins] |
9579 | Disregarding properties of two cats still leaves different objects, but what is now the difference? [Frege] |
9587 | How do you find the right level of inattention; you eliminate too many or too few characteristics [Frege] |
9588 | Number-abstraction somehow makes things identical without changing them! [Frege] |
9583 | Psychological logicians are concerned with sense of words, but mathematicians study the reference [Frege] |
9584 | Identity baffles psychologists, since A and B must be presented differently to identify them [Frege] |
17731 | Verificationism is better if it says meaningfulness needs concepts grounded in the senses [Jenkins] |
17732 | Success semantics explains representation in terms of success in action [Jenkins] |
19216 | Propositions (such as 'that dog is barking') only exist if their items exist [Williamson] |
17725 | 'Analytic' can be conceptual, or by meaning, or predicate inclusion, or definition... [Jenkins] |