29 ideas
| 8616 | How can multiple statements, none of which is tenable, conjoin to yield a tenable conclusion? [Elgin] |
| 8617 | Statements that are consistent, cotenable and supportive are roughly true [Elgin] |
| 3993 | Arguments are nearly always open to challenge, but they help to explain a position rather than force people to believe [Lewis] |
| 4901 | Truth has to be correspondence to facts, and a match between relations of ideas and relations in the world [Perry] |
| 3990 | The whole truth supervenes on the physical truth [Lewis] |
| 3991 | Where pixels make up a picture, supervenience is reduction [Lewis] |
| 4885 | Identity is a very weak relation, which doesn't require interdefinability, or shared properties [Perry] |
| 4899 | Possible worlds thinking has clarified the logic of modality, but is problematic in epistemology [Perry] |
| 4898 | Possible worlds are indices for a language, or concrete realities, or abstract possibilities [Perry] |
| 8618 | Coherence is a justification if truth is its best explanation (not skill in creating fiction) [Elgin] |
| 3995 | A mind is an organ of representation [Lewis] |
| 4887 | We try to cause other things to occur by causing mental events to occur [Perry] |
| 4884 | Brain states must be in my head, and yet the pain seems to be in my hand [Perry] |
| 4888 | It seems plausible that many animals have experiences without knowing about them [Perry] |
| 4891 | If epiphenomenalism just says mental events are effects but not causes, it is consistent with physicalism [Perry] |
| 3994 | Human pain might be one thing; Martian pain might be something else [Lewis] |
| 4900 | Prior to Kripke, the mind-brain identity theory usually claimed that the identity was contingent [Perry] |
| 3989 | I am a reductionist about mind because I am an a priori reductionist about everything [Lewis] |
| 4892 | If physicalists stick with identity (not supervenience), Martian pain will not be like ours [Perry] |
| 3992 | Folk psychology makes good predictions, by associating mental states with causal roles [Lewis] |
| 3996 | Folk psychology doesn't say that there is a language of thought [Lewis] |
| 4889 | Although we may classify ideas by content, we individuate them differently, as their content can change [Perry] |
| 3998 | If you don't share an external world with a brain-in-a-vat, then externalism says you don't share any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 3997 | Nothing shows that all content is 'wide', or that wide content has logical priority [Lewis] |
| 3999 | A spontaneous duplicate of you would have your brain states but no experience, so externalism would deny him any beliefs [Lewis] |
| 4000 | Wide content derives from narrow content and relationships with external things [Lewis] |
| 4896 | The intension of an expression is a function from possible worlds to an appropriate extension [Perry] |
| 4897 | A proposition is a set of possible worlds for which its intension delivers truth [Perry] |
| 4890 | A sharp analytic/synthetic line can rarely be drawn, but some concepts are central to thought [Perry] |