Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'A Structural Account of Mathematics', 'Good and Evil' and 'Could There Be Unicorns?'

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27 ideas

4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
It was realised that possible worlds covered all modal logics, if they had a structure [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / a. Systems of modal logic
If something is only possible relative to another possibility, the possibility relation is not transitive [Dummett]
Relative possibility one way may be impossible coming back, so it isn't symmetrical [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / d. System T
If possibilitiy is relative, that might make accessibility non-transitive, and T the correct system [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / g. System S4
In S4 the actual world has a special place [Dummett]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
Realists about sets say there exists a null set in the real world, with no members [Chihara]
We only know relational facts about the empty set, but nothing intrinsic [Chihara]
In simple type theory there is a hierarchy of null sets [Chihara]
The null set is a structural position which has no other position in membership relation [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
What is special about Bill Clinton's unit set, in comparison with all the others? [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / a. Sets as existing
The set theorist cannot tell us what 'membership' is [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 7. Natural Sets
ZFU refers to the physical world, when it talks of 'urelements' [Chihara]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 8. Critique of Set Theory
A pack of wolves doesn't cease when one member dies [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 6. Relations in Logic
The mathematics of relations is entirely covered by ordered pairs [Chihara]
5. Theory of Logic / K. Features of Logics / 2. Consistency
Sentences are consistent if they can all be true; for Frege it is that no contradiction can be deduced [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 3. Axioms for Geometry
Analytic geometry gave space a mathematical structure, which could then have axioms [Chihara]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 7. Mathematical Structuralism / c. Nominalist structuralism
We can replace existence of sets with possibility of constructing token sentences [Chihara, by MacBride]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / e. Ontological commitment problems
If a successful theory confirms mathematics, presumably a failed theory disconfirms it? [Chihara]
No scientific explanation would collapse if mathematical objects were shown not to exist [Chihara]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / a. Possible worlds
Possible worlds aren't how the world might be, but how a world might be, given some possibility [Dummett]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / c. Possible worlds realism
If possible worlds have no structure (S5) they are equal, and it is hard to deny them reality [Dummett]
18. Thought / E. Abstraction / 7. Abstracta by Equivalence
I prefer the open sentences of a Constructibility Theory, to Platonist ideas of 'equivalence classes' [Chihara]
19. Language / B. Reference / 3. Direct Reference / b. Causal reference
Mathematical entities are causally inert, so the causal theory of reference won't work for them [Chihara]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / a. Form of the Good
'Good' is an attributive adjective like 'large', not predicative like 'red' [Geach, by Foot]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / d. Virtue theory critique
To explain generosity in a person, you must understand a generous action [Dummett]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 7. Critique of Kinds
Generalised talk of 'natural kinds' is unfortunate, as they vary too much [Dummett]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 4. Standard Model / a. Concept of matter
'Gunk' is an individual possessing no parts that are atoms [Chihara]