Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'On Interpretation' and 'Four Dimensionalism'

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49 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 2. Possibility of Metaphysics
14721 Metaphysical enquiry can survive if its conclusions are tentative [Sider]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 4. Contraries
1708 In "Callias is just/not just/unjust", which of these are contraries? [Aristotle]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 10. Making Future Truths
1703 It is necessary that either a sea-fight occurs tomorrow or it doesn't, though neither option is in itself necessary [Aristotle]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 1. Correspondence Truth
1704 Statements are true according to how things actually are [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 1. Aristotelian Logic
22272 Aristotle's later logic had to treat 'Socrates' as 'everything that is Socrates' [Potter on Aristotle]
9405 Square of Opposition: not both true, or not both false; one-way implication; opposite truth-values [Aristotle]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 1. Modal Logic
9728 Modal Square 1: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contraries' of □¬P and ¬◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9729 Modal Square 2: ¬□¬P and ◊P are 'subcontraries' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9730 Modal Square 3: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'contradictories' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9731 Modal Square 4: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'contradictories' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9732 Modal Square 5: □P and ¬◊¬P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□¬P and ◊P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
9733 Modal Square 6: □¬P and ¬◊P are 'subalternatives' of ¬□P and ◊¬P [Aristotle, by Fitting/Mendelsohn]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 1. Bivalence
21593 In talking of future sea-fights, Aristotle rejects bivalence [Aristotle, by Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / D. Assumptions for Logic / 2. Excluded Middle
1701 A prayer is a sentence which is neither true nor false [Aristotle]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17447 Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 3. Being / e. Being and nothing
1706 Non-existent things aren't made to exist by thought, because their non-existence is part of the thought [Aristotle]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 5. Reason for Existence
1707 Maybe necessity and non-necessity are the first principles of ontology [Aristotle]
7. Existence / B. Change in Existence / 2. Processes
14760 Four-dimensionalism sees things and processes as belonging in the same category [Sider]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 6. Categorical Properties
14194 Proper ontology should only use categorical (actual) properties, not hypothetical ones [Sider]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / e. Individuation by kind
14745 If sortal terms fix the kind and the persistence conditions, we need to know what kinds there are [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / b. Cat and its tail
14740 If Tib is all of Tibbles bar her tail, when Tibbles loses her tail, two different things become one [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
14752 Artists 'create' statues because they are essentially statues, and so lack identity with the lump of clay [Sider]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / d. Coincident objects
14743 The stage view of objects is best for dealing with coincident entities [Sider]
9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 5. Composition of an Object
14747 'Composition as identity' says that an object just is the objects which compose it [Sider]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 12. Essential Parts
14757 Mereological essentialism says an object's parts are necessary for its existence [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
14727 Three-dimensionalists assert 'enduring', being wholly present at each moment, and deny 'temporal parts' [Sider]
14738 Some might say that its inconsistency with time travel is a reason to favour three-dimensionalism [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
14726 Four-dimensionalists assert 'temporal parts', 'perduring', and being spread out over time [Sider]
14728 4D says intrinsic change is difference between successive parts [Sider]
14729 4D says each spatiotemporal object must have a temporal part at every moment at which it exists [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
14730 Temporal parts exist, but are not prior building blocks for objects [Sider]
14762 Four-dimensionalism says temporal parts are caused (through laws of motion) by previous temporal parts [Sider]
14731 Temporal parts are instantaneous [Sider]
14758 How can an instantaneous stage believe anything, if beliefs take time? [Sider]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 9. Ship of Theseus
14741 The ship undergoes 'asymmetric' fission, where one candidate is seen as stronger [Sider]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 8. Leibniz's Law
14754 If you say Leibniz's Law doesn't apply to 'timebound' properties, you are no longer discussing identity [Sider]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
14763 Counterparts rest on similarity, so there are many such relations in different contexts [Sider]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 2. Meaning as Mental
2337 For Aristotle meaning and reference are linked to concepts [Aristotle, by Putnam]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 4. Mental Propositions
13763 Spoken sounds vary between people, but are signs of affections of soul, which are the same for all [Aristotle]
19. Language / F. Communication / 3. Denial
1705 It doesn't have to be the case that in opposed views one is true and the other false [Aristotle]
27. Natural Reality / A. Classical Physics / 1. Mechanics / a. Explaining movement
14725 Maybe motion is a dynamical quantity intrinsic to a thing at a particular time [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / C. Space / 6. Space-Time
14735 Space is 3D and lacks a direction; time seems connected to causation [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
1702 Things may be necessary once they occur, but not be unconditionally necessary [Aristotle]
14722 Between presentism and eternalism is the 'growing block' view - the past is real, the future is not [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / h. Presentism
14756 For Presentists there must always be a temporal vantage point for any description [Sider]
14724 Presentists must deny truths about multiple times [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / c. Tenses and time
14723 Talk using tenses can be eliminated, by reducing it to indexical connections for an utterance [Sider]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / f. Tenseless (B) series
14734 The B-series involves eternalism, and the reduction of tense [Sider]
14736 The B-theory is adequate, except that it omits to say which time is present [Sider]