Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'The Consolations of Philosophy' and 'Laws of Nature'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts


49 ideas

4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
The Square of Opposition has two contradictory pairs, one contrary pair, and one sub-contrary pair [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Traditional quantifiers combine ordinary language generality and ontology assumptions [Harré]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Some quantifiers, such as 'any', rule out any notion of order within their range [Harré]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 4. Intrinsic Properties
Scientific properties are not observed qualities, but the dispositions which create them [Harré]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Laws of nature remain the same through any conditions, if the underlying mechanisms are unchanged [Harré]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
Reasoning relates to understanding as time does to eternity [Boethius, by Sorabji]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 1. Observation
In physical sciences particular observations are ordered, but in biology only the classes are ordered [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 3. Experiment
Reports of experiments eliminate the experimenter, and present results as the behaviour of nature [Harré]
14. Science / A. Basis of Science / 5. Anomalies
We can save laws from counter-instances by treating the latter as analytic definitions [Harré]
14. Science / B. Scientific Theories / 1. Scientific Theory
Since there are three different dimensions for generalising laws, no one system of logic can cover them [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / a. Grue problem
The grue problem shows that natural kinds are central to science [Harré]
'Grue' introduces a new causal hypothesis - that emeralds can change colour [Harré]
14. Science / C. Induction / 5. Paradoxes of Induction / b. Raven paradox
It is because ravens are birds that their species and their colour might be connected [Harré]
Non-black non-ravens just aren't part of the presuppositions of 'all ravens are black' [Harré]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / i. Explanations by mechanism
The necessity of Newton's First Law derives from the nature of material things, not from a mechanism [Harré]
15. Nature of Minds / C. Capacities of Minds / 6. Idealisation
Idealisation idealises all of a thing's properties, but abstraction leaves some of them out [Harré]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 1. Nature of Free Will
Knowledge of present events doesn't make them necessary, so future events are no different [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 2. Sources of Free Will
Rational natures require free will, in order to have power of judgement [Boethius]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 6. Determinism / a. Determinism
God's universal foreknowledge seems opposed to free will [Boethius]
Does foreknowledge cause necessity, or necessity cause foreknowledge? [Boethius]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / b. Intellectualism
The wicked want goodness, so they would not be wicked if they obtained it [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
Rewards and punishments are not deserved if they don't arise from free movement of the mind [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
When people fall into wickedness they lose their human nature [Boethius]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / a. Nature of happiness
Happiness is a good which once obtained leaves nothing more to be desired [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
The bad seek the good through desire, but the good through virtue, which is more natural [Boethius]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / j. Unity of virtue
Varied aims cannot be good because they differ, but only become good when they unify [Boethius]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
You can't control someone's free mind, only their body and possessions [Boethius]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 1. Natural Kinds
Science rests on the principle that nature is a hierarchy of natural kinds [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 1. Laws of Nature
Classification is just as important as laws in natural science [Harré]
Newton's First Law cannot be demonstrated experimentally, as that needs absence of external forces [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 2. Types of Laws
Laws can come from data, from theory, from imagination and concepts, or from procedures [Harré]
Are laws of nature about events, or types and universals, or dispositions, or all three? [Harré]
Are laws about what has or might happen, or do they also cover all the possibilities? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 5. Laws from Universals
Maybe laws of nature are just relations between properties? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 7. Strictness of Laws
We take it that only necessary happenings could be laws [Harré]
Laws describe abstract idealisations, not the actual mess of nature [Harré]
Must laws of nature be universal, or could they be local? [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / c. Essence and laws
Laws of nature state necessary connections of things, events and properties, based on models of mechanisms [Harré]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 9. Counterfactual Claims
In counterfactuals we keep substances constant, and imagine new situations for them [Harré]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 5. God and Time
Divine eternity is the all-at-once and complete possession of unending life [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / a. Divine morality
Where does evil come from if there is a god; where does good come from if there isn't? [Boethius]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / c. God is the good
God is the supreme good, so no source of goodness could take precedence over God [Boethius]
God is the good [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / a. Cosmological Proof
The power through which creation remains in existence and motion I call 'God' [Boethius]
28. God / B. Proving God / 3. Proofs of Evidence / b. Teleological Proof
The regular events of this life could never be due to chance [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 2. Immortality / a. Immortality
The reward of the good is to become gods [Boethius]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
God can do anything, but he cannot do evil, so evil must be nothing [Boethius]
If you could see the plan of Providence, you would not think there was evil anywhere [Boethius]