Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'The Nature of Mathematics' and 'Mental Events'

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these texts

22 ideas

1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 3. Scientism
14782 Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 3. Non-Contradiction
14787 Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce]
5. Theory of Logic / C. Ontology of Logic / 3. If-Thenism
14783 Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17447 Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
6. Mathematics / C. Sources of Mathematics / 6. Logicism / a. Early logicism
14788 Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 1. Possibility
14786 Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 1. Empiricism
14789 Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
14785 The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce]
17. Mind and Body / B. Behaviourism / 4. Behaviourism Critique
4983 There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 1. Reductionism critique
3529 Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 2. Anomalous Monism
2307 Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim]
5497 Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan]
4081 Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane]
2321 If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim]
3404 Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 3. Property Dualism
3405 If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 5. Supervenience of mind
16041 Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 5. Causal Argument
6620 Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / b. Multiple realisability
3429 Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / b. Defining ethics
14784 Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / b. Causal relata
3524 Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin]
3526 Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin]