Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'The Handbook [Encheiridion]' and 'Truthmakers and Converse Barcan Formula'

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17 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 5. What Makes Truths / b. Objects make truths
The truthmaker principle requires some specific named thing to make the difference [Williamson]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
The converse Barcan formula will not allow contingent truths to have truthmakers [Williamson]
Truthmaker is incompatible with modal semantics of varying domains [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 3. Modal Logic Systems / h. System S5
If metaphysical possibility is not a contingent matter, then S5 seems to suit it best [Williamson]
4. Formal Logic / D. Modal Logic ML / 7. Barcan Formula
If the domain of propositional quantification is constant, the Barcan formulas hold [Williamson]
Converse Barcan: could something fail to meet a condition, if everything meets that condition? [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 1. Quantification
Not all quantification is either objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 4. Substitutional Quantification
Substitutional quantification is metaphysical neutral, and equivalent to a disjunction of instances [Williamson]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 7. Unorthodox Quantification
Not all quantification is objectual or substitutional [Williamson]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
If 'fact' is a noun, can we name the fact that dogs bark 'Mary'? [Williamson]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / e. Possible Objects
Our ability to count objects across possibilities favours the Barcan formulas [Williamson]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / f. Compassion
Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C]
If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / a. Right to punish
Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus]
28. God / B. Proving God / 2. Proofs of Reason / b. Ontological Proof critique
A thing can't be the only necessary existent, because its singleton set would be as well [Williamson]