38 ideas
2922 | All intelligent Romans were Epicureans [Nietzsche] |
11147 | Naturalistic philosophers oppose analysis, preferring explanation to a priori intuition [Margolis/Laurence] |
23520 | Truth has had to be fought for, and normal life must be sacrificed to achieve it [Nietzsche] |
2914 | One must never ask whether truth is useful [Nietzsche] |
13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
11141 | Modern empiricism tends to emphasise psychological connections, not semantic relations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11142 | Body-type seems to affect a mind's cognition and conceptual scheme [Margolis/Laurence] |
11121 | Language of thought has subject/predicate form and includes logical devices [Margolis/Laurence] |
11120 | Concepts are either representations, or abilities, or Fregean senses [Margolis/Laurence] |
11122 | A computer may have propositional attitudes without representations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11124 | Do mental representations just lead to a vicious regress of explanations [Margolis/Laurence] |
11123 | Maybe the concept CAT is just the ability to discriminate and infer about cats [Margolis/Laurence] |
11125 | The abilities view cannot explain the productivity of thought, or mental processes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11140 | Concept-structure explains typicality, categories, development, reference and composition [Margolis/Laurence] |
11128 | Classically, concepts give necessary and sufficient conditions for falling under them [Margolis/Laurence] |
11130 | Typicality challenges the classical view; we see better fruit-prototypes in apples than in plums [Margolis/Laurence] |
11129 | The classical theory explains acquisition, categorization and reference [Margolis/Laurence] |
11131 | It may be that our concepts (such as 'knowledge') have no definitional structure [Margolis/Laurence] |
11132 | The prototype theory is probabilistic, picking something out if it has sufficient of the properties [Margolis/Laurence] |
11133 | Prototype theory categorises by computing the number of shared constituents [Margolis/Laurence] |
11134 | People don't just categorise by apparent similarities [Margolis/Laurence] |
11135 | Complex concepts have emergent properties not in the ingredient prototypes [Margolis/Laurence] |
11136 | Many complex concepts obviously have no prototype [Margolis/Laurence] |
11137 | The theory theory of concepts says they are parts of theories, defined by their roles [Margolis/Laurence] |
11138 | The theory theory is holistic, so how can people have identical concepts? [Margolis/Laurence] |
11139 | Maybe concepts have no structure, and determined by relations to the world, not to other concepts [Margolis/Laurence] |
11146 | People can formulate new concepts which are only named later [Margolis/Laurence] |
2921 | Philosophy grasps the limits of human reason, and values are beyond it [Nietzsche] |
20138 | Christianity is at war with the higher type of man, and excommunicates his basic instincts [Nietzsche] |
20375 | Virtues must be highly personal; if not, it is merely respect for a concept [Nietzsche] |
2915 | Each person should devise his own virtues and categorical imperative [Nietzsche] |
2920 | A God who cures us of a head cold at the right moment is a total absurdity [Nietzsche] |
2917 | Christianity is a revolt of things crawling on the ground against elevated things [Nietzsche] |
2918 | The story in Genesis is the story of God's fear of science [Nietzsche] |
2919 | 'Faith' means not wanting to know what is true [Nietzsche] |
2916 | The great lie of immortality destroys rationality and natural instinct [Nietzsche] |