24 ideas
13886 | Later Frege held that definitions must fix a function's value for every possible argument [Frege, by Wright,C] |
9845 | We can't define a word by defining an expression containing it, as the remaining parts are a problem [Frege] |
10019 | Only what is logically complex can be defined; what is simple must be pointed to [Frege] |
9886 | Cardinals say how many, and reals give measurements compared to a unit quantity [Frege] |
9889 | Real numbers are ratios of quantities [Frege, by Dummett] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
10020 | Frege's biggest error is in not accounting for the senses of number terms [Hodes on Frege] |
10553 | A number is a class of classes of the same cardinality [Frege, by Dummett] |
9887 | Formalism misunderstands applications, metatheory, and infinity [Frege, by Dummett] |
8751 | Only applicability raises arithmetic from a game to a science [Frege] |
16435 | Plantinga proposes necessary existent essences as surrogates for the nonexistent things [Plantinga, by Stalnaker] |
14655 | The 'identity criteria' of a name are a group of essential and established facts [Plantinga] |
14658 | 'Being Socrates' and 'being identical with Socrates' characterise Socrates, so they are among his properties [Plantinga] |
9891 | The first demand of logic is of a sharp boundary [Frege] |
14656 | Does Socrates have essential properties, plus a unique essence (or 'haecceity') which entails them? [Plantinga] |
14654 | Properties are 'trivially essential' if they are instantiated by every object in every possible world [Plantinga] |
14653 | X is essentially P if it is P in every world, or in every X-world, or in the actual world (and not ¬P elsewhere) [Plantinga] |
14660 | If a property is ever essential, can it only ever be an essential property? [Plantinga] |
14661 | Essences are instantiated, and are what entails a thing's properties and lack of properties [Plantinga] |
14657 | Does 'being identical with Socrates' name a property? I can think of no objections to it [Plantinga] |
14652 | 'De re' modality is as clear as 'de dicto' modality, because they are logically equivalent [Plantinga] |
14659 | We can imagine being beetles or alligators, so it is possible we might have such bodies [Plantinga] |
9890 | The modern account of real numbers detaches a ratio from its geometrical origins [Frege] |
11846 | If we abstract the difference between two houses, they don't become the same house [Frege] |