15 ideas
18739 | Three stages of philosophical logic: syntactic (1905-55), possible worlds (1963-85), widening (1990-) [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18741 | Logical formalization makes concepts precise, and also shows their interrelation [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18744 | Models are sets with functions and relations, and truth built up from the components [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
18740 | If 'exist' doesn't express a property, we can hardly ask for its essence [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17644 | Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam] |
17648 | It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam] |
17643 | Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam] |
18745 | A Tarskian model can be seen as a possible state of affairs [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18747 | The 'spheres model' was added to possible worlds, to cope with counterfactuals [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18748 | Epistemic logic introduced impossible worlds [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18746 | Possible worlds models contain sets of possible worlds; this is a large metaphysical commitment [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
18750 | Using possible worlds for knowledge and morality may be a step too far [Horsten/Pettigrew] |
17642 | The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam] |
17645 | An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam] |