Combining Texts

All the ideas for 'Frege's Theory of Numbers', 'Why there isn't a ready-made world' and 'What is it like to be a bat?'

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11 ideas

6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / c. Counting procedure
17447 Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
17644 Metaphysical realism is committed to there being one ultimate true theory [Putnam]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
17648 It is an illusion to think there could be one good scientific theory of reality [Putnam]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 3. Unity Problems / c. Statue and clay
17643 Shape is essential relative to 'statue', but not essential relative to 'clay' [Putnam]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
17642 The old view that sense data are independent of mind is quite dotty [Putnam]
15. Nature of Minds / B. Features of Minds / 1. Consciousness / b. Essence of consciousness
3286 An organism is conscious if and only if there is something it is like to be that organism [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / A. Mind-Body Dualism / 7. Zombies
3288 Can we describe our experiences to zombies? [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / D. Property Dualism / 6. Mysterianism
4883 Nagel's title creates an impenetrable mystery, by ignoring a bat's ways that may not be "like" anything [Dennett on Nagel]
3287 We can't be objective about experience [Nagel]
17. Mind and Body / E. Mind as Physical / 7. Anti-Physicalism / d. Explanatory gap
4989 Physicalism should explain how subjective experience is possible, but not 'what it is like' [Kirk,R on Nagel]
26. Natural Theory / C. Causation / 8. Particular Causation / d. Selecting the cause
17645 An alien might think oxygen was the main cause of a forest fire [Putnam]